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On a cold Friday at the end of January
 
this year, I drove up to Tower Colliery,
near Hirwaun,on the northernmost edge of
 
the South Wales coalfield, to witness the
 
last rites being read to a slice of Welsh
 
history. On that day,less than six weeks
 
ago,the deep mined coal industry of South
 
Wales effectively came to an end. Thir-
teen years earlier, in January 1995, 200
 
employees of Tower had bought from
 
British Coal the right to keep the pit open,
and the intervening period had been one of
 
remarkable initiative, confidence and
 
struggle by the miners themselves. But
 
the history of the colliery is much longer
 
than just this recent episode,for there had
 
been mining at Tower since 1864, and at
 
various times the colliery had been owned
 
by the Marquess of Bute, responsible for
 
the rapid urban development of Cardiff and
 
much else besides in the nineteenth century;
and by other great names of the private
 
history of coal in South Wales: D.R.
Llewellyn and Sons, Welsh Associated
 
Collieries, and Powell Duffryn. The coal
 
mined there included bituminous or house
 
coal,steam coal,anthracite coal,and iron-
stone as well: almost the full range of
 
products available in the South Wales coal-
field, all at this one colliery. What will
 
happen to Tower now is a matter for
 
debate: the headgear is in receipt of a
 
preservation order and cannot be scrapped,
some would like to see some kind of
 
museum, others leisure facilities, others
 
still a housing estate. The single example
 
of Tower, I feel, captures so much of the
 
history of the South Wales coal industry,
and also of the debates that continue to
 
surround projects to regenerate the former
 
coalmining communities.
In the time I have available I wish to
 
do two things. First, to sketch out, very
 
roughly,the modern history of the rise and
 
fall of the South Wales coalfield and the
 
reasons for coal’s ultimate demise. Once
 
this is done,I wish to survey the range of
 
responses to the decline of the coal industry
 
in South Wales which may be gathered
 
under the modern term of‘regeneration’.
The beginnings of the modern industry
 
go back,one might say,to the discovery of
 
steam coal reserves in the Cynon valley in
 
1837, although there had been significant
 
mining of bituminous coal for decades,
indeed centuries. But it was the high qual-
ity steam coal (particularly suitable for
 
raising steam in boilers)which marked out
 
South Wales as important,and during the
 
1840s more steam coal seams were located
 
in the central coalfield. During the second
 
half of the nineteenth century the industry
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 expanded rapidly. Whereas in 1854 8.5m
 
tons of coal were being mined annually,
twenty years later the total had doubled to
 
16.5m tons, 26% of which was exported,
and the industry employed 73,000 miners.
These figures represented some 13% of the
 
total British output of coal,and 14% of the
 
total British workforce in the industry.
Expansion continued until the end of the
 
century with hitherto largely untouched
 
valleys being exploited (the Ogwr in the
 
1860s, the Garw in the 1870s, the Aber in
 
the 1890s). By 1897,production had risen
 
to 36m tons annually, and employment to
 
127,000 (18% of both British output and
 
workforce). South Wales was by this
 
stage predominantly an exporting coal-
field,with 20m tons(56% of all production)
destined for overseas markets.
The period before the outbreak of the
 
First World War was one of intense
 
growth. New collieries were sunk. Pro-
duction broke through the 40m ton barrier
 
in 1902,and passed 50m tons in 1908,62%
of which was destined for export markets.
The workforce continued to grow in tan-
dem:numbering 150,000 in 1901 it had rea-
ched 201,000 by 1908. Peak production
 
figures were reached in 1913 (57m tons),
and Professor Stanley Jevons of Cardiff
 
predicted that the coalfield would continue
 
to yield up to 100m tons per annum for at
 
least 200 years.
The war itself created a great demand
 
for coal. The Admiralty,which previous-
ly had an annual order for 1.5m tons of
 
Welsh coal,increased its purchasing to 15m
 
tons. Coal was needed at munitions fac-
tories,and in iron,steel,and tinplate works
 
and foundries. In the immediate after-
math of conflict the industry benefited
 
from the post-war economic boom.
Employment in the coalfield rose to an
 
all-time high of 271,500 in 1920. But this
 
immediate post-war prosperity was tempo-
rary and fragile. Labour productivity had
 
fallen by a quarter between 1914 and 1920,
and the collapse of the export price of coal
 
resulted in Welsh coal being produced at a
 
significant loss by 1921. There was a tem-
porary recovery in trade from 1922 to 1924:
production topped 54m tons in 1923, and
 
employment stabilised at around 250,000.
But with Welsh coal facing stiff competi-
tion in overseas markets from German and
 
American coal,and with Britain’s return to
 
the Gold Standard in 1925 hampering
 
exports in general,the industrial relations
 
crisis of 1926, in which Britain’s miners
 
were locked-out for 7 months,compounded
 
the problem,and was followed in 1929 by
 
the onset  of the global  depression.
Employment in the coal industry fell stead-
ily from 1926 to 1937, from 218,00 to
 
136,000.
The outbreak of the Second World
 
War initially had a positive impact on the
 
coal industry. Rearmament and the war
 
economy resulted in an increased demand
 
for coal and its workers, leading to an
 
easing in unemployment and a rise in
 
wages. The Fall of France brought this
 
brief prosperity to an abrupt end. The
 
export market collapsed and many col-
lieries closed. Production fell from 35m
 
tons in 1939 to 22m tons in 1944, and the
 
workforce fell by over 16,000. But the
 
Labour party’s sweeping victory in the
 
General Election of 1945 was followed in
 
1947 by the coal industry being taken into
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 public ownership.
The industry that  began the
 
nationalised era was very different from
 
that which had struggled through the inter-
war decades. The number of working pits
 
had been drastically pruned, from nearly
 
500 in the 1920s to 222, and output was
 
down to 21m tons in 1947. This rose
 
slightly to a peak of 24m tons in 1952,and
 
was sustained throughout the remainder of
 
the decade, in spite of 74 pit closures
 
between 1947 and 1960. In the 1960s pro-
duction dropped first to around 19m tons
(less than 10% of total British output),and
 
then down again to 13m in 1970. At this
 
point there were still over 50 collieries in
 
the coalfield. Employment, which had
 
stood at 115,500 at nationalisation (about
 
15% of the Welsh male workforce, the
 
largest single employment sector), fell
 
below 100,000 in 1959 and below 50,000 a
 
decade later (to about 6% of the Welsh
 
male workforce).
While some new mines were sunk or
 
significantly modernised in this period their
 
impact was small and the steady decline in
 
the levels of global and domestic demand
 
for coal imposed its own logic. The oil
 
crises of the 1970s,which caused a halving
 
of the relative cost of coal compared with
 
oil, brought only short-lived respite. The
 
coming to power of the Conservatives in
 
1979,with its emphasis on the private sec-
tor,signalled the end for the South Wales
 
coal industry. Coal was to be prepared for
 
privatisation, and had to be made leaner
 
and fitter. This meant the closure of what
 
were deemed to be‘uneconomic’pits and a
 
major clash with the National Union of
 
Mineworkers.
On the eve of the 1984-85 strike,20,000
 
miners were employed in the 28 mines of
 
south Wales, producing 7m tons of coal.
The NUM’s defeat in the strike meant that
 
the Conservative government had a green
 
light to proceed with pit closures and with
 
privatisation. In 1994 British Coal
 
attempted to close the last deep mine in the
 
coalfield in Tower colliery,Hirwaun, and
 
although they failed,14 years on that mine
 
is now shut and a phase in Welsh industrial
 
history is finally over.
The scale of this transformation in the
 
economic and social structure of South
 
Wales may be gauged by observing that the
 
1921 population census recorded, that of
 
the 575,000 occupied males of 12 and above
 
in Glamorgan and Monmouthshire, no
 
fewer than 225,000 were employed in the
 
mining,39% of the whole. In some mining
 
valleys miners accounted for 3/4 of the
 
male workforce. Inevitably, the coal-
field’s economy was heavily reliant on this
 
industry. Even in those areas where other
 
industries(such as steel and tinplate)had a
 
presence,coal mining remained the major
 
employer. Many other workers, in the
 
transport sector, in brickworks, quarries,
coal carbonization plants and breweries,
were also dependent upon the orders of the
 
coal industry and its employees. But ulti-
mately,this was a society built on shifting
 
sands, for mining is inherently transitory,
and an economy based on mining does not
 
automatically generate a continuing indus-
trial society. The struggle for ‘regenera-
tion’has to be understood as always having
 
to face the challenge of plugging this mas-
sive gap left by the decline of coal.
Why did coal decline? Partly one can
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 blame the problem of retaining overseas
 
markets,partly the shift away from coal as
 
an energy source,and partly the challenges
 
of modernization that were rarely met
 
satisfactorily. Let  me say something
 
briefly about these three areas.
Markets:from 1898 to 1939 South Wales
 
primarily served overseas markets,with an
 
average of 57% of its produce being export-
ed. But there was an absolute decline in
 
the volume of exports from a peak of 37m
 
tons annually in 1913 to below 20m tons
 
from 1933 onwards. As an exporting coal-
field,South Wales producers always had to
 
struggle against foreign competitors when
 
developing and securing markets overseas.
At its peak,on the eve of the Great War,
Welsh coal found its greatest markets in
 
France, Italy, the Low Countries, South
 
America and North Africa. Some of its
 
earlier markets, in North America, India,
and the Middle and Far East,had already
 
shrunk,under pressure from coal industries
 
in the USA, India and Japan. More seri-
ous competition was to emerge in the 1930s
 
with the rise of the German and Polish
 
industries, which also displaced Welsh
 
exports from their own domestic markets
(as did the coal industries of France and
 
Spain). German coal captured substantial
 
shares of Welsh markets in France, the
 
Low Countries, Egypt, Brazil, Argentina,
Russia, Greece, Austria, Hungary and in
 
French colonial possessions. German coal
 
was also cheaply exported in the form of
 
reparations to Belgium,France and Italy.
Poland exported largely to Scandinavia
 
and Italy. Britain’s return to the Gold
 
Standard in 1925 inflated the relative price
 
of Welsh coal in overseas markets,and in
 
the 1930s France and Spain imposed import
 
limitations or quotas. The Second World
 
War killed off many remaining markets,
and exports became insignificant after
 
nationalization.
Energy regime shift:the demand for coal
 
was progressively outstripped by the
 
expansion of supplies in the 1920s and
 
1930s. Oil replaced coal as the preferred
 
fuel for new ships,and the Admiralty swit-
ched completely to oil after the First World
 
War. By 1930 its coal order was down to
 
an eighth of its pre-war level. More gener-
ally the proportion of coal-driven shipping
 
fell from nearly 90% in 1913 to under 55%
in 1932. Greater efficiencies in the use of
 
coal in electricity generation,in gas,and in
 
the iron and steel industries all combined to
 
reduce demand at  home and abroad.
Immediately after the Second World War
 
there was a period of excess demand which
 
helped to stabilise the industry but at the
 
end of the 1950s this was replaced by a
 
situation of excess supply. Coal had been
 
responsible for 90 percent of primary in-
land energy consumption in 1947 but some
 
former customers,especially the electricity
 
generators,began to switch to alternative
 
power sources such as oil and nuclear
 
power,while others,like the steel industry,
had reduced requirements owing to im-
proved fuel efficiency and declining output
 
levels.
Modernization:it was the relatively high
 
price demanded for Welsh coal in the
 
export  market  which most  severely
 
damaged its long-term competitiveness.
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The price was largely determined not by
 
fluctuations in wages but by the high costs
 
of production and the relatively low pro-
ductivity in the South Wales coal industry
 
in comparison with its competitors,many
 
of whom mechanised to a far greater
 
extent. In 1913 1% of south Wales output
 
was cut mechanically,and this rose to only
 
26% by 1938 (compared with British aver-
ages of 8 and 59% respectively). Given
 
that the introduction of cutters had the
 
potential to double output in a colliery this
 
might seem a tardy rate of progress.
Admittedly it is not necessarily the case
 
that these figures can be read as evidence
 
of poor entrepreneurship or a failure of
 
investment on the part of colliery com-
panies. The highly faulted geological
 
nature of the coal strata in South Wales
 
rendered the use of cumbersome cutting
 
equipment inappropriate in many seams.
And in the low-wage economy of the late
 
1920s and 1930s, the relative cost advan-
tages of the introduction of machinery
 
were considerably lessened, and the un-
predictability of the export market often
 
made it economically sensible to employ
 
extra hands as and when required, rather
 
than make the substantial investment of
 
introducing a coal-cutting system. All this
 
meant,however,that when the NCB took
 
over the pits in 1947,many of them were
 
old and their equipment out-dated. A key
 
task was to modernize the industry through
 
an increased use of machinery. Mines
 
which had exhausted their workable
 
reserves or which were too small or old for
 
economic working were to be closed and
 
replaced by either new mines or the recon-
struction and modernization of those mines
 
whose reserves warranted major capital
 
investment. Under normal circumstances
 
such plans could not have been implement-
ed overnight,and the fact that the industry
 
struggled to produce sufficient coal to meet
 
customer demand until 1957 meant that
 
many modernization schemes  were
 
delayed. When the downturn in demand
 
came, the NCB introduced an accelerated
‘crash’programme of mechanisation and
 
rationalisation in order to improve the
 
competitive position of the industry.
There was a further burst of capital invest-
ment planned in the early 1970s,aimed at
 
locating new coal reserves, creating new
 
mines and linking established neighbouring
 
pits into single high-production units. But
 
when the political complexion of govern-
ment changed in 1979 all these plans count-
ed for little. The NCB was instructed to
 
break-even within a short time and the
 
prospects for South Wales were poor.
Historically, productivity levels in the
 
South Wales coalfield had generally been
 
below those in other major British coal-
fields,and the coalfield’s performance dur-
ing the nationalised era had shown an
 
operating loss in 19 of the first 20 years.
Let me turn now to regeneration.
Although the term was not in use in the
 
1930s,there can be no doubt that the many
 
economists, regional planners, civil ser-
vants,miners’leaders,and politicians who
 
debated the economic future of the South
 
Wales coalfield had exactly the same prob-
lem in mind as we do today:what can you
 
do to compensate for the impact of the
 
decline of an industry on which such heavy
 
reliance has been placed,an industry with-
out which,after all,many of the coalfield
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 valley communities would not have come
 
into existence? In the immediate after-
math of the Second World War a sustained
 
effort was made to broaden the economic
 
base of south Wales, and to develop an
 
indigenous manufacturing sector.
There was a marked resurgence in the
 
prosperity of the iron and steel industry in
 
Wales, until the 1970s the greatest single
 
success story of the post-war Welsh econ-
omy. Growth was largely built around
 
two new works:Margam,which opened in
 
1951 as the largest steelworks in Britain,
and Llanwern outside Newport, which
 
began production in 1962. Other works or
 
new plants were opened at Trostre,Velin-
dre, Ebbw Vale, Newport, and Panteg.
South Wales became the leading steel-
making district of Britain,with production
 
rising (for Wales as a whole) from 4m
 
tonnes in 1950 to a high of 8.6m tonnes in
 
1965. Employment in metal manufacture
 
rose from around 82,000 to 95,000 in the
 
same period, with 75,000 of these jobs in
 
iron and steel.
Accompanying the boom in steel was,
by the late 1960s, an impressive array of
 
new factories making anything from zip
 
fasteners to optical equipment. Initially
 
assisted by the gradual conversion of the
 
wartime ordnance factories to civilian pur-
poses and by government provision of fac-
tory space for incoming employers, South
 
Wales found its economic base transfor-
med by a range of manufacturing indus-
tries. Domestic electrical appliances were
 
made by Hoover at Merthyr Tydfil;Prest-
cold made refrigerators at Swansea,Rover
 
and Borg-Warner made gearboxes at Car-
diff and Margam. The plastics industry
 




materials at Cwmbran. Many smaller fac-
tories produced toys, batteries, bicycles,
paint, optical fibre cable, Christmas deco-
rations,ceramic insulators and furniture.
Economic growth in Wales ran above
 
the UK average throughout the 1960s,but
 
talk of a‘second industrial revolution’was
 
over-optimistic, and was revealed as such
 
by the serious decline that took place in
 
both the coal and steel industries from the
 
mid-1970s. Diversification had been only a
 
partial success: almost a third of male
 
Welsh workers could be found in the coal
 
and steel industries by the early 1970s, so
 
the loss of nearly 20,000 jobs in coal
 
between 1969 and 1979 was still a serious
 
blow to overall economic health. More
 
strikingly, given its recent expansion, the
 
steel industry contracted very rapidly. In
 
1973 the British Steel Corporation had
 
employed 58,000 workers, but by 1986 it
 
paid the wages of only 15,000. The clo-
sures of plants at Ebbw Vale (1978), East
 
Moors in Cardiff(1978)and Shotton (1980)
were responsible for 19,000 of these job
 
losses alone,with severe trimming in other
 
plants.
Crisis in the heavy industries was par-
alleled by a slump in manufacturing from
 
1979. With its branch plants always vul-
nerable to cost-cutting decisions this hit
 
Wales particularly hard. There were
 
major cuts in jobs at many plants including
 
BP (Barry) and Hoover (Merthyr). The
 
bright spot on the Welsh economic horizon,
as far as manufacturing was concerned,
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in engineering (especially in electronics and
 
automotive components)from the Far East
 
capturing most attention. Virtually a fifth
 
of all manufacturing jobs in Wales were
 
with foreign firms by 1981,and Wales had
 
the highest  concentration of Japanese
 
plants in Europe by the mid-1980s,although
 
in fact most foreign investment in Wales
 
came from the USA.
Nevertheless, the fragility of the‘sec-
ond industrial revolution’is reinforced by
 
figures showing job losses in manufactur-
ing amounting to 125,000 from a total of
 
331,000 between 1966 and 1986 (there was
 
some stabilisation of the decline in the
 
1990s). In terms of occupational structure
 
and social class,Wales in the early 1980s
 
had a lower than average proportion of its
 
workforce (28% as against a UK average
 
of 32 percent)in groups I (professional),II
(managerial and technical) and III  N
(skilled non-manual). The arrival of sup-
posedly‘high tech’industries from the late
 
1970s onwards had little impact on histori-
cally low levels of skills because, very
 
often,although the products involved were
 
sophisticated, the labour needed and the
 
techniques required were elementary-so-
called‘screwdriver technology’.
The most revolutionary developments
 
in the post-war Welsh economy occurred in
 
the service sector,with the rise of white-
collar rather than blue-collar jobs. To
 
some extent this was stimulated by govern-
ment planning policy,with the moving of
 
the Royal Mint to Llantrisant in 1968, the
 
siting of Companies House in Cardiff, the
 
Passport Office in Newport,and the Driver
 
and Vehicle Licensing Centre (employing
 
over 5,000 by 1977)in Morriston,Swansea.
More recently the Welsh Assembly Govern-
ment has opened offices in coalfield loca-
tions including Merthyr Tydfil, Bedwas
 
and Tredegar. Much was also owed to the
 
expansion of the welfare state and educa-
tion system, which overshadowed growth
 
in private sector services. Whereas bank-
ing, finance and insurance accounted for
 
55,800 jobs in 1984, other services were
 
responsible for 286,400,representing virtu-
ally a third of all employment in Wales.
Heavy concentrations of service-sector
 
employment could be found in Cardiff and
 
the Vale of Glamorgan. A further 90,000
 
jobs were linked to the tourist industry,
although many of these were part-time or
 
seasonal. Although the ‘typical Welsh
 
worker’is a crude concept,it might be said
 
that such a person was more likely to be a
 
clerk, a nurse or a part-time worker in a
 
cafeteria than a miner, steelworker or
 
farmer by the mid 1980s. They were also
 
almost as likely to be female than male,as
 
by the early 1980s over half of Welsh
 
women of working age were economically
 
active, comprising over two-fifths of the
 
total workforce (and becoming an actual
 
majority by the late 1990s).
Despite the upsurge of manufacturing
 
industry and the service sector in Wales,
historic weaknesses in the structure of the
 
Welsh economy remained. This is evident
 
in per capita figures for gross domestic
 
product (GDP), available from 1966
 
onwards. In that year the figure for
 
Wales (£510)was, of all British regions,
ahead only of those for Northern Ireland
 
and the North of England,and a long way
 
below the UK average (£605). The rela-
tive position worsened from the early
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 1970s,and by 1984 Wales was ahead only of
 
Northern Ireland,with a per capita figure
 
of £3850, far behind the UK average of
£4612. To this day Wales remains one of
 
the most disadvantaged areas of the UK in
 
terms of GDP,wage levels,indices of poor
 
health and of economic inactivity.
If the industrial diversification strat-
egy of the immediate post-war decades
 
may be seen,ultimately, to have failed to
 
deliver on the promise of its‘second indus-
trial revolution’,where now are we to look
 
for the paths to regeneration? A number
 
of options have been debated, discussed,
and even trialled,and I want to conclude by
 
reflecting on a few of these.
One such strategy has been to embrace
 
the potential of the heritage industry.
Thomas Jones foresaw this, with his
 
tongue in his cheek,in the New Statesman,
in July 1935:
Certainly if we want to turn South
 
Wales into an industrial museum there’s
 
no shortage of blueprints. ... The
 
Rhymney Valley might be flooded and
 
made into a lake. For the Rhondda
 
and Merthyr area we urge an irrevo-
cable Standstill Order,once all human
 
beings have been evacuated to the
 
Hounslow / Dagenham green belt.
The Office of Works should then pro-
ceed to protect all approaches from
 
souvenir hunters and should invite His
 
Majesty to declare the area an open
 
Museum to illustrate the Industrial
 
Revolution. Some winding  engines
 
should be kept in open repair and
 
enable visitors to descend the pit shifts
 
and explore the subterranean galleries,
an experience which should be no less
 
thrilling than a visit to the catacombs
 
of Rome.
50 years later and this vision was no
 
longer satire but rather a plausible inter-
pretation of what might be in the process of
 
occurring. Great things were expected,
for example, of Rhondda Heritage Park,
based at the old Lewis Merthyr Colliery in
 
Trehafod,at the lower end of the Rhondda
 
valleys. Some of the most ambitious plans
 
have never been realised, however, and
 
original visitor figures of 400,000 visitors
 
per annum have been revised downwards to
 
around 60,000 per annum. To be fair,
given the small numbers employed, both
 
here and at Big Pit Mining Museum at
 
Blaenavon, now part of the National
 
Museum of Wales,it is highly unlikely that
 
such ventures, however well-intentioned
 
and authentic,are ever likely to kick-start
 
local economies. Tourism is now one of
 
the most important industries in Wales,
with over 10% of all jobs,and contributes
 
about 5% of Welsh GDP. But the South
 
Wales valleys are,though beautiful in their
 
own way,insufficiently iconic to match the
 
profile of coasts,castles,and mountains for
 
which most outside visitors come to Wales.
Heritage can take its place as part of a
 
widespread portfolio of leisure opportu-
nities in the valleys,of course. Many for-
mer colliery sites have been converted into
 
parks, many former railway lines into
 
cycle paths. The Welsh International
 
Climbing Centre sits where once the Taff-
Merthyr colliery did,and other sites have
 
been used for housing or retail purposes.
Spoil tips have been reclaimed and re-
shaped,once industrial landscapes afforest-
ed.
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Another option has been to recognize
 
that the kind of mass employment associat-
ed with labour-intensive industries such as
 
coal is highly unlikely to return to the
 
coalfield,and that its future,or the future
 
of parts of it,may instead reside in forming
 
a commuter belt for people working in the
 
port cities of Newport,Cardiff and Swan-
sea, or in other locations along the so-
called M4 corridor. There has been con-
siderable investment in better road facil-
ities, bypassing town centres, facilitating
 
more rapid movement up and down and
 
between valleys. There has been a revival
 
in some valley rail services,most recently
 
up the Llynfi valley to Maesteg,and up the
 
Ebbw valley to Ebbw Vale. But given that
 
about 750,000 people,that is one-quarter of
 
the population of Wales, lives in the val-
leys,one shudders to think of the implica-
tions of the continuation of this trend (in
 
terms of private motoring)for congestion
 
and environmental damage.
I have two further worries about all of
 
this. First,much of the relative prosperity
 
that we see in some of the coal mining
 
valleys today depends partly on historically
 
high house prices, and partly on the eco-
nomic renaissance of Cardiff, and to a
 
lesser extent Swansea and Newport. I
 
wonder how much the fragile Welsh econ-
omy might be put in jeopardy by the much-
heralded economic downturn? Second,
even though some parts of the coalfield are
 
well-connected to the M4 corridor and to
 
the cities, and have benefited from the
 
wave-like effect  of house price rises
 
emanating from more expensive urban
 
areas, there remain significant pockets of
 
high unemployment, material deprivation
 
and social exclusion across the coalfield.
In some cases, this may be explicable by
 
geographical factors-it takes a long time,
for example, to drive from some valley
 
settlements to the cities. In some cases,
there are levels of underachievement, of
 
what is called the dependency culture, of
 
teenage pregnancy and of drug use which
 
make the rehabilitation of the entire coal-
field and its population an extremely chal-
lenging issue. There remains much to do.
Whether all coalfield communities are ulti-
mately sustainable at a level of economic
 
well-being that we would accept ourselves
 
or want for our children is,I suspect,highly
 
doubtful,and I have a feeling that some of
 
the very hard times that the South Wales
 
valleys went through in the 1970s and 1980s
 
may be about to return.
Chris Williams,Swansea University,
St David’s Day,1 March 2008.
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